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The
February 15 antiwar demonstrations proved it: the
self-organization of free singularities is possible on a
planetary scale. And that was an event, despite all that
followed. In a manifesto-text written just after those
demonstrations, I used the language of Negri and Hardt
to say that the multitudes could create a rift in
Empire. In a context where the Aristocracy (the great
transnational companies) had been weakened by a string
of financial disasters, where the Monarchy (the
political and military command of the earth) had fallen
apart in serious dissension, I wanted to encourage the
democratic action of the Plebe, against the scorn of the
American, British, Spanish and Italian leaders. It was a
moment that had multiplied the world's political stages,
overflowing the traditional mechanisms of representation.
This overflow of
the multitudes had the surprising character of any real
event. Yet it wasn't unexpected. We had just crossed
another threshold in the constitution of the networked
resistance that became visible with the movements against
neoliberal globalization. And now everyone can see how
many other thresholds remain. After the war in Iraq,
I still think the multitudes can produce a rift in Empire.
But that rift must be produced, in Europe and
throughout the world. How to seize the opportunity of
refusal that revealed itself during the war? How to
go much further? Here I'll look into the meaning of
these words, multitudes, rift and Empire
- in hopes that some work with words might help prolong
the movements against war.
The multitude is
a figure of political philosophy. But it is inseparable
from the actual pathways of the multitudes, as a set
of singularities that comes into being through productive
activity. What's new is the intersection of thinking
and production. Labor - the simple activity of earning
a living - is no longer an object of politics, but its
departure point, its language or its very principle.
It is known that
contemporary labor involves linguistic creativity, the
expression of affects, spontaneous cooperation. These
are the sources of innovation, indispensable for cognitive
capitalism. But no boss can command creativity, expressivity,
cooperation - these things cannot be submitted to any
disciplinary regime. On the contrary, a certain kind
of insubordination must be actively encouraged, in the
very interest of productivity. And the possibilities
of cooperation must be extended, so that everyone can
cross the geographic, cultural and economic distances
that separate the participants in a contemporary work
group. Modern managerial technique consists in establishing
a flexible framework for productive relations. Clearly,
the paradigmatic framework for contemporary labor is
the Internet. The advantage of such networked systems,
for contemporary managers, is to isolate the individuals
they link. Yet the ties of optical fiber are real, like
the cooperation they encourage. And the establishment
of this productive framework took networkers by surprise,
because it allowed so much freedom. Now we see that
this freedom is always associated with highly personalized
control of the employees, via advanced techniques of
surveillance. Everything that happens in the productive
framework will also be surveilled, and the ideas, expressions
and collective behaviors that prove harmful to the business
will be repressed.
Between insubordination
and surveillance, creativity and control, you have one
of the internal contradictions of the new production
regime. The fact that it puts thought to work guarantees
the extension of the contradiction beyond the limits
of salaried activity. As André Gorz writes in his recent
book, L'immatériel: "The more work calls
on talent, virtuosity, the production of the self...
the more these capabilities tend to overflow their limited
application to any determinant task." Therefore
the worker "will locate his dignity in the free
exercise of his capacities, outside of the working context:
journalists writing books, ad designers creating artworks,
computer programmers demonstrating their virtuosity
as hackers and developers of free software, etc."
One might feel tempted to laugh at this image of "ad
designers creating artworks." The results have
been mixed, to say the least. We have seen an outpouring
of collective narcissism, a facile idealization of expressivity
and interactivity - particularly in the magazine-gallery-museum
world, where "ad designers creating artworks"
had their day in the sun, throughout the 1990s. But
something seems to have changed since then.
The immaterial laborer
who thinks, speaks and creates on the job, then finally
leaves that job behind to practice a form of creative
expression, very soon feels the fragility of her position.
Nothing permits her to survive while doing what she
had nonetheless been consistently encouraged to do.
Reflecting on her own predicament, she can meet all
kinds of people: similar individuals marginalized by
the effects of the same contradiction, then many others
who have never been fully integrated into the productive
system. By making the comparison between one's own situation
and those of others, one attains a broader understanding
of contemporary social relations, with their hierarchies
of inclusion/exclusion extending across the earth. A
personal experience of marginality, of precarious labor
conditions, can encourage all kinds of solidarities,
near or far. This moment of politicization implies at
least a partial exit from the productive framework imposed
by capitalist management. What then becomes interesting
is to continue putting thinking to work. With this difference,
that the work has become autonomous: it consists in
weaving alternative networks, in view of solidarities
and dissenting expressions.
It is at this point
that the concept of the multitude can become doubly
useful for the multitudes: as an ontological concept,
and as a concept of class. As an ontological concept,
the multitude indicates a plane of immanence where human
singularities discover their fragile potential - that
is, the possibility of developing their own individuation
through cooperation with others. But as a class concept,
the multitude points to everything that stands in the
way of this development. That obstacle is Empire:
i.e. the sum total of control techniques forged by the
corporations and states. These control techniques come
to bear on our flesh as biopower: the capacity
to manage, channel and parasitically exploit the creative
power of cooperating singularities. Today, biopower
increasingly takes on the explicitly repressive forms
of surveillance and the police. Not only will workers
be surveilled on the job; but the entire population
will be surveilled, while moving through the open systems
of transport, exchange and communication. And surveillance
is necessarily followed by the police. For the multitudes
of the movements against capitalist globalization, Imperial
power has taken on the perfectly standardized face of
the "robocops" who carried out the repression
in Seattle, Nice, Gothenborg, Genoa, etc. But through
the visor of the robocop, what we see - in addition
to their eyes - is an organizational mutation
that gives rise to the Imperial state.
Here I refer to
the book by Rob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist
State. Jessop analyzes the paradigmatic shift from
a Keynesian national welfare state, to a postnational
Schumpeterian workfare state. What do these words mean?
The contemporary state no longer cares about the "effective
demand" of the workers, nor about any kind of Keynesian
social insurance; its preoccupation is with encouraging
entrepreneurial innovation, which for Schumpeter was
a major source of surplus value. But this kind of innovation,
necessary for competition, is done by a fairly small
part of the population, marked by a strong tendency
toward exit. They tend to leave the constraints of the
productive system. As soon as people quit working, the
state's problem is no longer that of their welfare;
on the contrary, they must be pushed back into the most
servile and exploited positions, by way of the coercive
programs that Tony Blair calls workfare. The state takes
on the role of a collective manager for the flexible
labor force - an imperative role under the transnational
regime of networked competition. Thus it becomes postnational,
adapting to the extended frameworks of capitalist productivity.
Yet like the economy it serves, this Imperial form of
the state is not stable, or even viable. It is shot
through with grotesque contradictions, whereby technical
and organizational innovation, the new mainspring of
capitalist competition, leads to the political rationality
of unlimited war.
Here, to my mind,
lies one of the greatest ironies of the current period.
The multitudes, as Toni Negri has never ceased to explain,
are incommensurable: their immaterial expressions and
cooperative innovations are irreducible to the measure
of labor time, and therefore to the hourly wage. This
disproportion of the multitudes can be understood from
several different angles. On the one hand, it translates
the enormous creative potential of scientific knowledge,
particularly as it accumulates in the form of technology:
and how shall we evaluate the "productivity"
of the finger that activates a machine? On the other
hand, it brings the indeterminacy of aesthetic experience
into play at the very heart of social relations: and
how shall we judge the "value" of different
expressions? Thus work is uncoupled from wages, and
tends to become autonomous. But throughout the 1990s,
this uncoupling, this absence of any viable measure,
acted in favor of financial speculation, encouraging
the most exaggerated valuations of certain sectors,
notably where high technology is the vehicle of human
expression. The irony lies here. The krach of the new
economy in spring 2000 was followed by a general slowdown
throughout the world, putting an end to the "roaring
nineties." Shortly thereafter, in the face both
of an inevitable recession and intense criticism over
the conditions of his election, G.W. Bush took the September
11 terrorism and the state of exception it justifies
as the ideal means to consolidate his shaky presidency
- and more broadly, to realize the disciplinary vision
of the American neoconservatives. For it is war, and
no doubt war alone, that allows the state to impose
its discipline on an autonomous labor force, after it
has been mobilized and deceived by the untenable promises
of a contradictory production regime.
So we come to the
question: What is to be done? As soon as the US took
the warpath toward the Iraqis and their oil, the multitudes
reacted, overflowing all the bounds of political consensus,
and infiltrating all the networks. In Europe the mobilizations
were particularly strong: because people remember the
1930s, and they recognize the state of exception, the
attempt to impose a new discipline. Great Britain saw
the largest demonstration of its history; Italy and
Spain were shaken by repeated mobilizations and direct
actions; and France, Germany and Belgium translated
public opinion into political opposition, within the
arenas of the UN, NATO and the European Union. These
dissensions at the heart of the political and military
command are new: they mark a first step, a fragile chance
to be seized. But can one really speak of a rift in
Empire?
First, look at the
reality: since the early 1990s, the European Union has
increasingly become a distorted mirror of the United
States. That is to say, a regional free-trade bloc built
up according to the rules of Imperial competition. This
neoliberal turn may be cloaked in social charters, but
at this point, they count for very little. And the risk
that appears with each bout of European chauvinism,
whatever its pacifist or anti-American overtones, is
that under its cover, countries like France, Germany
and Belgium will form a falsely social-democratic center,
constructed around a core of protected industries, armament
above all - while living in reality off the exploitation
of peripheries, internal or external. The danger is
that the political class will use familiar hegemonic
formulas to reinstate the existing hierarchies of inclusion/exclusion,
but on a continental scale. These hierarchies, forged
according to the old Fordist model, are protected at
gunpoint today. And so France, Germany, Belgium and
Luxembourg held meetings on April 29, 2003, to speak
about founding a common military force. In the newspaper
Le Monde of that same day, a text appeared under
the title: "European Defense: Time to Take Action!"
The authors were four CEOs from the European defense
lobby - our familiar representatives.
Life is elsewhere.
The politics of the multitudes consists in opposing
the techniques of control, in escaping them - but in
such a way that the production of this exodus is itself
linguistic, cooperative, affective. What's interesting
in the networked demonstrations is exactly that: what
André Gorz called the "free exercise" of each
one's creative faculties. But this self-organization
is just a foretaste of deeper resistance. A real rift
in Empire will require a transformation of the specific
forms of redistribution and coercion put into operation
by the state, and the creation of more viable frameworks
for productive existence. We must dissolve the Schumpetarian
postnational workfare state, which upholds unlimited
competition and war. And that means carrying out political
struggles on the measured ground of representative democracy,
without forgetting that the power of the multitudes
overflows all the borders. The challenge of the 21st
century, in Europe and elsewhere, is to construct social
infrastructure that can sustain the incommensurable
- outside any technique of capture and control.
References:
- "We Plebians,"
posted to nettime and multitudes-infos, February 19,
2003.
- Toni Negri, "Pour une
définition ontologique de la multitude," Multitudes
9, 2002.
- André Gorz, L'immatériel:
connaisssance, valeur et capital, Paris, Galilée,
2003.
- Paolo Virno, Grammaire
des multitudes, Paris, l'Eclat, 2002.
- Bob Jessop, The Future
of the Capitalist State, Cambridge, Polity Press,
2002.
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