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"We
have no future because our present is too volatile.
The only possibility that remains is the management
of risk. The spinning top of the scenarios of the present
moment."
(W.
Gibson: Pattern recognition, tr. It. L'accademia
dei sogni)
In
February 2003 the American journalist Bob Herbert published
in the New York Times the results of a cognitive survey
on a sample of hundreds of unemployed youths in Chicago:
none of their interviewees expected to find work the
next few years, none of them expected to be able to
rebel, or to set off large scale collective change.
The general sense of the interviews was a sentiment
of profound impotence. The perception of decline did
not seem focused on politics, but on a deeper cause,
the scenario of a social and psychical involution that
seems to cancel every possibility of building alternatives.
The
fragmentation of the present time is reversed in the
implosion of the future. In The Corrosion of Character:
the Transformation of Work in Modern Capitalism
(Norton: 1998; tr. It. L'Uomo Flessibile),
Richard Sennett reacts to this existential condition
of precariousness and fragmentation with nostalgia for
a past epoch in which life was structured in relatively
stable social roles, and time had enough linear consistency
to construe paths of identity. "The arrow of time
is broken: in an economy under constant restructuring
that is based on the short-term and hates routine, definite
trajectories no longer exist. People miss stable human
relations and long term objectives." (R. Sennett:
The corrosion of character)
But
this nostalgia has no hold on present reality, and the
attempts to reactivate the community remain artificial
and sterile.
In
the essay "Precari-us?",
Angela Mitropoulos observes that precariousness is a
precarious notion. This because it defines its object
in an approximate manner, but also because from this
notion derive paradoxical, self-contradictory, in other
words precarious strategies. If we concentrate our critical
attention on the precaricious character of job performance
what would our proposed objective be? That of a stable
job, guaranteed for life? Naturally no, this would be
a cultural regression that would definitely subordinate
the role of work. Some started to speak of Flexicurity
to mean forms of wage independent of job performance.
But we are still far from having a strategy of social
recomposition of the labour movement to extricate ourselves
from unlimited exploitation. We need to pick up again
the thread of analysis of the social composition and
decompositon if we want to distinguish possible lines
of a process of recomposition to come.
In
the 1970s the energy crisis, the consequent economic
recession and finally the substitution of work with
numerical machines resulted in the formation of a large
number of people with no guarantees. Since then the
question of the precarity became central to social analysis,
but also in the ambitions of the movement. We began
by proposing to struggle for forms of guaranteed income,
uncoupled from work, in order to face the fact that
a large part of the young population had no prospect
of guaranteed employment. The situation has changed
since then, because what seemed a marginal and temporary
condition has now become the prevalent form of labour
relations. Precariousness is no longer a marginal and
provisional characteristic, but it is the general form
of the labour relation in a productive, digitalized
sphere, reticular and recombinative.
The
word 'precariat' generally stands for the area of work
which is no longer definable by fixed rules relative
to the labour relation, to salary and to the length
of the working day. However if we analyse the past we
see that these rules functioned only for a limited period
in the history of relations between labour and capital.
Only for a short period at the heart of the C20th, under
the political pressures of unions and workers, in conditions
of (almost) full employment and thanks to a role more
or less strongly regulatory of the state in the economy,
some limits to the natural violence of capitalist dynamics
could be legally established. The legal obligations
that in certain periods have protected society from
the violence of capital were always founded on the existence
of a relation of a force of a political and material
kind (workers' violence against the violence of capital).
Thanks to political force it became possible to affirm
rights, establish laws and protect them as personal
rights. With the decline in the political force of the
workers' movement, the natural precariousness of labour
relations in capitalism and its brutality have reemerged.
The
new phenomenon is not the precarious character of the
job market, but the technical and cultural conditions
in which info-labour is made precarious.The technical
conditions are those of digital recombination of info-work
in networks. The cultural conditions are those of the
education of the masses and the expectations of consumption
inherited from late C20th society and continuously fed
by the entire apparatus of marketing and media communication.
If
we analyse the first aspect, i.e. the technical transformations
introduced by the digitalisation of the productive cycle,
we see that the essential point is not the becoming
precarious of the labour relation (which, after all,
has always been precarious), but the dissolution of
the person as active productive agent, as labour power.
We have to look at the cyberspace of global production
as an immense expanse of depersonalised human time.
Info-labour,
the provision of time for the elaboration and the recombination
of segments of info-commodities, is the extreme point
of arrival of the process of the abstraction from concrete
activities that Marx analysed as a tendency inscribed
in the capital labour relation.
The
process of abstraction of labour has progressively stripped
labour time of every concrete and individual particularity.
The atom of time of which Marx speaks is the minimal
unit of productive labour. But in industrial production,
abstract labour time was impersonated by a physical
and juridcal bearer, embodied in a worker in flesh and
bone, with a certified and political identity. Naturally
capital did not purchase a personal disposition, but
the time for which the workers were its bearers. But
if capital wanted to dispose of the necessary time for
its valorization, it was indispensable to hire a human
being, to buy all of its time, and therefore needed
to face up to the material needs and trade union and
political demands of which the human was a bearer.
When
we move onto the sphere of info-labour there is no longer
a need to have bought over a person for eight hours
a day indefinitely. Capital no longer recruits people,
but buys packets of time, separated from their interchangeable
and occasional bearers.
De-personalised
time has become the real agent of the process of valorisation,
and de-personalised time has no rights, nor any demands
either. It can only be either available or unavailable,
but the alternative is purely theoretical because the
physical body despite not being a legally recognised
person still has to buy his food and pay his rent.
The
informatic procedures of the recombination of semiotic
material have the effect of liquifying the 'objective'
time necesssary to produce the info-commodity. All the
time of life the human machines is there, pulsating
and available, like a brain-sprawl in waiting. The extension
of time is meticuously cellularised: cells of productive
time can be mobilised in punctual, casual and fragmentary
forms. The recombination of these fragments is automatically
realised in the network. The mobile phone is the tool
that makes possible the connection between the needs
of semio-capital and the mobilisation of the living
labour of cyber-space. The ringtone of the mobile phone
calls the workers to reconnect their abstract time to
the reticular flux.
It's
a strange word that with which we identify the ideology
prevalent in the posthuman transition to digital slavery:
liberalism. Liberty is its foundational myth, but the
liberty of whom? The liberty of capital, certainly.
Capital must be absolutely free to expand in every corner
of the world to find the fragment of human time available
to be exploitated for the most miserable wage. But liberalism
also predicates the liberty of the person. The juridical
person is free to express itself, to choose its representatives,
to be entrepreneurial at the level of politics and the
economy.
Very
interesting, only that the person has disappeared, what
is left is like an inert object, irrelevant and useless.
The person is free, sure. But his time is enslaved.
His liberty is a juridical fiction to which nothing
in concrete daily life corresponds. If we consider the
conditions in which the work of the majority of humanity,
proletariat and cognitariat, is actually carried out
in our time, if we examine the conditions the average
wage globally, if we consider the current and now largely
realised cancellation of previous labour rights, we
can say with no rhetorical exaggeration that we live
in a regime of slavery. The average salary on the global
level is hardly sufficient to buy the indispensible
means for the mere survival of a person whose time is
at the service of capital. And people do not have any
right over the time of which they are formally the proprietors,
but effectively expropriated. That time does not really
belong to them, because it is separated from the social
existence of the people who who make it available to
the recombinative cyberproductvie circuit. The time
of work is fractalised, that is reduced to minimal and
reassemblable fragments, and the fractualisation makes
it possible for capital to constantly find the conditions
of minimum salary.
How
can we oppose the decimation of the working class and
its systemic de-personalisation, the slavery that is
affirmed as a mode of command of precarious and de-personalised
work? This is the question that is posed with insistence
by whoever still has a sense of human dignity. Nevertheless
the answer does not come out because the form of resistance
and of struggle that were efficacious in the C20th appear
to no longer have the capacity to spread and consolidate
themselves, nor consequently can they stop the absolutism
of capital. An experience that derives from worker’s
struggle in the last years, is that the struggle of
precarious workers does not make a cycle. Fractalised
work can also punctually rebel, but this does not set
into motion any wave of struggle. The reason is easy
to understand. In order for struggles to form a cycle
there must be a spatial proximity of the bodies of labour
and an existential temporal continuity. Without this
proximity and this continuity, we lack the conditions
for the cellularised bodies to become community. No
wave can be created, because the workers do not share
their existence in time, and behaviours can only become
a wave when there is a continuous proximity in time
that info-labour no longer allows.
Translated
by Erik Empson
(English Version from: http://www.generation-online.org/t/
tinfolabour.htm
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